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THE FAMILY AND MEDICAL LEAVE ACT OF 1993:
PROVING OR DEFENDING A CLAIMED VIOLATION
Anita, a thirty-six year old divorced mother of two, works
part-time at a local retail clothing store. The store is one of a chain
of stores that employs hundreds of full and part-time employees
within a seventy-five mile radius. Anita works twenty-five hours per
week, and she has not missed a scheduled day of work in over a year.
Anita's youngest daughter, Brittany, recently developed a respiratory infection as a result of catching a bad cold. Brittany's doctor
examined her, prescribedan antibiotic,and then examined the child
a second time after Brittany had an adverse reaction to the antibiotic. The doctor advised Anita to keep Brittany home from school
for the next four days to ensure that she could rest and to make sure
there were no adverse reactions to the new medicine. Anita asks her
manager about taking the four days off without pay. What should
the manager say? Does she have a choice? Does the answer change
if it is the week before Christmas, and the store is already shorthanded?
I. INTRODUCTION
The Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993 (" the Act" or
"FMLA")' was enacted to help working people take the time they
need to care for their own serious health conditions, or those of certain specified relatives, without fear of losing their jobs.2 Although
some states already had family leave statutes in place, the FMLA
created a uniform national "floor" for family leave benefits.' Recently, an increasing number of FMLA cases are making their way
through the American judicial system, and it is important for litigators to be aware of the various methods federal judges are using for
analyzing these claims." This Note will focus on the substantive

' 29 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2654 (1994).
2 id.

3 See

29 U.S.C. § 2651 (b) (stating FMLA cannot reduce state or local
family leave rights).
4 See infra notes
101-111 and accompanying text (discussing trends
developing in FMLA case law).
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rights guaranteed by the FMLA and the responsibilities assigned to
both employer and the employee under the Act.5
Section II of this Note will provide a brief overview of the
FMLA.6 Section III examines the requirements that employees must
satisfy to give their employer "adequate notice" of their need for
FMLA protected leave.7 Section IV analyzes what federal courts
require to find that an employee, or someone in the employee's immediate family, has a "serious health condition." 8 Section V considers whether there are any discernible trends developing in the
FMLA case law. 9 Finally, Section VI concludes that while the first
five years under the FMLA has generated some conflicting case law,
the courts are now developing a consistent method of analysis that

' See Hodgens v. General Dynamics Corp., 144 F.3d 151, 159 (1st Cir.
1998) (distinguishing between FMLA substantive rights and discrimination
protection). In Hodgens, a case of first impression for the First Circuit, the Court

of Appeals ruled that where an employee alleges he was discriminated against for
using FMLA rights, only the anti-discrimination protection of the Act is involved.
Id. at 160. The court opined that descrimination claims under the FMLA should
be analyzed differently than those involving substantive rights, and where
discrimination is alleged the court will employ the same burden shifting
analytical framework used when reviewing other discrimination cases, such as
those related to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e
through 2000 e-17. Id. The First Circuit's decision to adopt the split analysis
method was consistent with earlier decisions in other circuits. See Diaz v. Fort
Wayne Foundry Corp., 131 F.3d 711, 713 (7th Cir. 1997) (rejecting burden

shifting approach to FMLA cases involving denial of substantive rights); see also
Morgan v. Hilti, Inc., 108 F.3d 1319, 1323 (10th Cir. 1997) (utilizing burden
shifting approach only when analyzing proscriptive portion of FMLA).
"See infra notes 11-30 and accompanying text (summarizing history of the

Act).

See infra notes 31-65 and accompanying text (discussing notice

requirements).
'See infra notes 66-100 and accompanying text (examining legislative and
judicial interpretations of what constitutes a "serious health condition").
9 See infra notes 101-111 and accompanying text (discussing whether any
trends emerging in FMLA case law).
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should allow both employees and their employers more certainty as
to what their respective rights and obligations are under the Act. 1
II. OVERVIEW OF THE FMLA
President Clinton signed the FMLA on February 5, 1993, and
the Act required adherence by most employers beginning six months
later." The FMLA covers all state, local, and federal employers, as
well as all private sector employers that employ fifty or more employees within a seventy-five mile radius. Employers with fewer
than fifty employees cannot voluntarily subject their companies to
coverage under the Act. 3 The FMLA expressly acknowledges a
number of socioeconomic realities that challenge today's American
workforce in general and women in particular.' 4 The FMLA pro,0But see infra note 112 and accompanying text (contending FMLA case
law analysis not well developed).
" 29 C.F.R. § 825.102(a) (1996).
1229 U.S.C. § 261 l(4)(iii).
" See Douglas v. E.G. Baldwin & Assoc., Inc., 150 F.3d 604, 608 (6th Cir.
1998) (holding fifty employee threshold statutorily created and not subject to
waiver).
14 29 U.S.C. § 2601(a). The full
section states:
Congress finds thatthe number of single-parent households and two-parent households in
which the single parent or both parents work is increasing significantly; it is important for the development of children and the family
unit that fathers and mothers be able to participate in early childrearing
and the care of family members who have serious health conditions;
the lack of employment policies to accommodate working parents can
force individuals to choose between job security and parenting; there is
inadequate job security for employees who have serious health conditions that prevent them from working for temporary periods; due to the
nature of the roles of men and women in our society, the primary responsibility for family caretaking often falls on women, and such responsibility affects the working lives of women more than it affects the
working lives of men; and employment standards that apply to one
gender only have serious potential for encouraging employers to discriminate against employees and applicants for employment who are
of that gender.

256

JOURNAL OF TRIAL & APPELLATE ADVOCACY

[Vol. IV

poses to "provide a national policy that supports families in their
efforts to strike a workable balance between the competing demands
of the workplace and the home." "5Only two-thirds of all American
employees, however, work at sites covered by the FMLA. 6 The
number of workers actually protected by the FMLA slips to about
fifty percent after applying the7 Act's length of service and hoursrelated eligibility requirements.
The FMLA entitles eligible employees to up to twelve weeks
of unpaid leave per twelve month period for a variety of reasons."
Eligible employees are those who have worked for a covered employer for at least one year and have worked at least 1,250 hours for
the employer within the last twelve months.' 9 Even those that are not
current employees may be entitled to protection under the FMLA.20
Employers may require an employee on a FMLA protected
absence to provide certification from a health care provider of their

Id.

29 U.S.C. § 2601(b)(l)-(2).
16

See COMMIssIoN ON LEAVE, A WORKABLE BALANCE: REPORT TO

(Executive Summary, p.
xvi)(1996) (reporting results of two nationally representative surveys).
7 Id. The FMLA covers slightly less than eleven percent of private-sector

CONGRESS ON FAMILY AND MEDICAL LEAVE POLICIES,

worksites in the United States. Id. A total of sixty percent of all American
private-sector employees work at these covered worksites, because they are
typically very large. Id.
'" See 29 U.S.C. § 2612(a) (detailing absences which qualify for FMLA

protected leave). Specifically, covered employees are entitled to leave for the
birth and care of the newborn child of the employee, for the placement with the
employee of a son or daughter for adoption or foster care, to care for a spouse,
child, or parent with a "serious health condition", or to take medical leave when
the employee is unable to work because of their own "serious health condition".
Id.
1'29 U.S.C. § 261 l(2)(A)(i)-(ii).
'0See Duckworth v. Pratt & Whitney, Inc., 152 F.3d 1, 5 (1st Cir. 1998)
(holding prior leave by former employee cannot be used against that person now
seeking re-employment).
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need for leave." Once a FMLA protected absence ends, the employer must restore the employee to their original, or a substantially
similar position in the organization.22 The Massachusetts federal
district court recently ruled that employers are also prohibited from
making an independent determination of whether the employee is fit
to return to work.23 In addition, an employee's use of FMLA leave
cannot result in the loss of any employment benefit that the employee earned prior to using FMLA leave.24 Similarly, FMLA leave
against the employee under a "no fault" attencannot be counted
25
dance policy.
The possibility of individual supervisors being held liable for
FMLA violations is a particularly thorny issue for employers. 6 The
Act defines an employer as "any person who acts, directly or indirectly, in the interest of an employer to any of the employees of such
employer." 27 This language mirrors that of the Fair Labor Standards
Act (FLSA) 28 and individual liability under the FLSA has been
clearly established. 29 The federal district court for the District of
Massachusetts has also held that individuals may be personally liable
for adverse employment decisions or actions.30

2"

See 29 U.S.C. § 2613(b) (stating employer certification form may

require reason and probable duration of leave).
22 29 U.S.C. § 2614(a)(1)(A)-(B).
See Albert v. Runyon, 6 F. Supp. 2d 57, 62 (D. Mass. 1998) (deciding
postal worker's recovery from depression not challengeable by employer).
2429 U.S.C. § 2614(a)(2).
5 29 C.F.R. § 825.220(c) (1996).
1995) (holding
26 See Freemon v. Foley, 911 F. Supp. 326, 330 (N.D. I11.
individual liability appropriate under FMLA).
27 29 U.S.C. § 261 1(4)(A)(ii)(I).
29 U.S.C. § 203(d) (1938).
Z. Green, Individual Supervisors May Be Found Liable For
Violations of the FMLA, 1/98 CORPLT 61, (col. 1). (explaining ramifications of
recent court decisions on individual supervisor liability).
' See Meara v. Bennett, 27 F. Supp. 2d 288, 290 (D. Mass. 1998) (noting
virtual unanimity among federal district courts that individual liability can be
appropriate). In this case, a former assistant district attorney who suffered a
nervous breakdown in court was allowed to sue the county district attorney
29See Michael
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III. EFFECTIVE NOTICE TO EMPLOYER
Before employees can utilize the protections of the FMLA,
they must provide their employer with adequate notice of their need
for leave.3 ' When the need for FMLA leave is foreseeable, at least
thirty days advance notice must be provided.32 Where thirty days
notice is not possible, notice must occur as soon as practicable."
The "as soon as practicable" standard entails a close examination of
the particular facts of the case involved.3 4 The employee only needs
to give the employer notice once, but the employee must alert the
employer "as soon as practicable" if dates of scheduled leave
change or are extended.35
When giving notice to an employer, the employee does not
need to expressly assert rights under the FMLA. 6 In fact, in the
landmark case on this issue the employee gave adequate notice to an
employer although she was not even aware of the existence of the
FMLA. 7 Under the final regulations and case law, once the employer is notified the burden shifts to the employer to seek out information as to whether the employee is seeking a FMLA protected

alleging the district attorney prevented him from returning to work despite
clearance from his physician. Id. at 288.
3, See Richard Heffern, Federal Act Continues to Confuse Employers,
9/1/97 Cap. Dist. Bus. R. (Albany N.Y.) 21; 1997 WL 10936047 (explaining
what notice triggers employer obligations under the Act).
3229 U.S.C. § 2612(e)(1) (1994).
33ld.
3429 C.F.R. § 825.302(b) (1996). Where thirty days notice is not possible,
"as soon as practicable" ordinarily requires at least verbal notification to the

employer within one or two business days of the date when the need for leave
becomes known to the employee. Id.
" 29 C.F.R. § 825.302(a) (1996).
3' 29 C.F.R. § 825.302(c) (1996).
17 See Manuel v. Westlake Polymers Corp., 66
F.3d 758, 764 (5th Cir.
1995) (interpreting regulations as not requiring knowledge of rights under statutes
to invoke its protection). In addition, the Manuel court held that determining

adequate notice is a question of fact. Id.
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leave." The employer may require a certification from a health care
provider that the leave addresses a "serious health condition." 39
An employer may require an employee seeking FMLA leave
to provide written notice, or certification, from a health care provider
that explains when the serious health condition began, how long the
condition is likely to last, and the medical facts known to the health
care provider pertaining to the condition.40 Although the FMLA specifically allows this certification process by employers, failure of the
employee to provide certification does not automatically nullify the
employee's protection. If an employee gives the employer timely
verbal or other notice, the employer is obligated to promptly grant an
employee's otherwise protected leave. 2 When the need for medical
treatments is foreseeable, the employee must consult with the employer prior to the scheduling of medical treatment.43 The intent of
the consultation is to work out a treatment schedule that best suits the
needs of both the employer and the employee." If the employee fails
to make reasonable attempts to consult with the employer regarding
the scheduling of treatments, the employer has the right to initiate
treatment-scheduling discussions. 4
Most conflicts arise when an employee's need for leave is unforeseeable.46 The employee should provide notice to the employer
3

See supra note 36 (outlining employee notice responsibilities under

FMLA); see also Price v. City of Fort Wayne, 117 F.3d 1022, 1026 (7th Cir.

1997) (holding employer on notice of employee's need for leave has
responsibility to inquire further).

'9 29 C.F.R. § 825.305(a) (1996). "An employer must give notice of a
requirement for medical certification each time a certification is required." Id.
40 29 U.S.C. § 2613(b)(l)-(3) (1994).
Q29 C.F.R. § 825.302(d).
42 Id.
4'

29 C.F.R. § 825.302(e).

"Id.
45Id.

See, e.g., Gay v. Gilman Paper Co., 125 F.3d 1432, 1436 (11th Cir.
1997) (analyzing whether husband's telephone conversation sufficient to notify
employer of employee's need for FMLA leave); Hopson v. Quitman County
Hosp. and Nursing Home, Inc., 126 F.3d 635, 640 (5th Cir. 1997) (considering
46
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either in person or by telephone, telegraph, facsimile ("fax"), or
other electronic means. 7 If the employee is unable to personally
give notice, the employee's spouse, adult family member, or other
responsible party may provide notice. 48 As with foreseeable leave,
the employee need not expressly assert rights under the FMLA or
reference the Act. 49 The employee simply needs to alert the employer that they need leave for medical reasons.0 The employer then
bears the burden of obtaining any additional required information."
The employee or spokesperson must then provide information such
as the length of leave needed. 2
In Price v. City of Fort Wayne, 3 the court of appeals liberally
interpreted the adequate notice requirement. 4 The court found that
filling out the city-provided leave request form, combined with an
indication that the cause pertained to medical problems, was sufficient to put the city on notice that the leave was possibly FMLA
protected." In addition, the court ruled that once put on notice of an
employee's request to take FMLA
leave, the employer has the re56
further.
inquire
to
sponsibility
The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals analyzed the adequate
notice standard in Gay v. Gilman Paper Co. 7 In Gay, the employee
was admitted to a psychiatric hospital to receive treatment for a

whether change in circumstance can justify less than thirty days notice to
employer); Carter v. Ford Motor Co., 121 F.3d 1146, 1147 (8th Cir. 1997)

(deciding wife gave inadequate notice when stating husband would be out due to
"family problems").

,729 C.F.R. § 825.303(b) (1996).
48

id.

4929
50

C.F.R. § 825.303(a) (1996).

id.

51Id.
52Id.

" 117 F.3d 1022.
Id. at 1025.
55Id.
'6Id.
17

at 1026.

125 F.3d 1432, 1436.
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nervous breakdown." When the plaintiff's husband contacted her
employer, he told the supervisor that she was "undergoing tests."5 9
The court found that the plaintiff's husband had failed to adequately
put the employer on notice that the leave was "potentially FMLAqualifying."60 Other cases have echoed this approach. 6'
A change in the employee's circumstances can also override
the thirty-day notice requirement.6 2 In Hopson v. Quitman County
Hospital and Nursing Home, Inc. ,63 the plaintiff rescheduled her
breast reduction surgery to ensure insurance coverage.64 The Hopson
court ruled that the adequacy of notice in such a case is a question of
fact, and the trier of fact should examine the issue using a threepronged analysis..65

8Id. at 1433.
59Id.

0Id. at 1436.
" See, e.g., Carter v. Ford Motor Co., 121 F.3d at 1147 (finding employee
gave insufficient notice when wife notified employer husband would be "out for
a while"). In that case, thirteen days after his last day of work the employee
verbally notified employer that he was requesting sick leave, but he failed to turn
in a completed form by his doctor (describing the need for leave) prior to his
termination two days later. 121 F.3d at 1146-47.
' See Hopson v. Quitman County Hosp. and Nursing Home, Inc., 126 F.3d
at 640 (holding change need not be medical emergency to trigger reduction of
advanced notice requirement).
63 Id. at 639
6 Id. at 640.
65 126 F.3d at 640. The first prong of the analysis entails an examination
of whether there was a change in circumstance. Id. If the trier-of-fact finds that
there was a change in circumstance, they must then decide whether the employee
gave notice as soon as practicable and made reasonable efforts to schedule
treatment so as not to unduly disrupt the employer's operations. Id. The trier-offact will need to answer each of these questions affirmatively before determining
whether the employee provided adequate notice. Id.
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IV. SERIOUS HEALTH CONDITION
Assuming the employee provided adequate notice to the employer, the next critical issue is whether the employee can establish
that they or an applicable family member had a "serious health condition" that warranted protection by the FMLA. 66 The FMLA defines "serious health condition" as an "illness, injury, impairment, or
physical or mental condition that involves inpatient care or continuing treatment by a health care provider." 67 Federal judges sometimes
criticize this requirement as overly vague because what constitutes a
condition serious enough to trigger FMLA protection is often difficult to determine.68 Perhaps anticipating the concern over the exact
meaning of the statute's language, the Department of Labor's final

Compare Victorelli v. Shadyside Hosp., 128 F.3d 184, 187 (3d Cir.
1997) (finding peptic ulcer potentially "serious health condition") and Thorson v.
Gemini, Inc., 123 F.3d 1140, 1142 (8th Cir. 1997) (holding even relatively minor
ailments can sometimes trigger FMLA protection) with Murray v. Red Kap
Indus., Inc., 124 F.3d 695, 699 (5th Cir. 1997) (finding respiratory tract infection
not "serious health condition" as matter of law) and Price v. Marathon Cheese
Corp., 119 F.3d 330, 335 (5th Cir. 1997) (holding carpal tunnel syndrome not
"serious health condition").
67 29 U.S.C. § 2611(11) (1994). Inpatient care is usually readily apparent
because it requires an overnight stay in a hospital, but the continuing treatment
option is more elusive because a variety of conditions will satisfy its
requirements. Id. For example, continuing treatment includes any period of time
that an employee is unable to come to work and perform their duties for three
consecutive days, as long as the employee receives two or more treatments by a
health care provider for the condition. Id. Any subsequent incapacitation for the
same condition also qualifies for FMLA protection, and even a single treatment
by a health care provider may satisfy the continuing treatment test. Id.
Therefore, a course of prescription medication or therapy requiring special
equipment to resolve or alleviate the health condition may satisfy the "serious
health condition" test, but treatment that includes the taking of over-the-counter
medications is not sufficient to constitute a regimen of continuing treatment for
purposes of FMLA leave. Id.
,8See Seidle v. Provident Mut. Life Ins. Co., 871 F. Supp. 238, 242 (E.D.
Pa. 1994) (characterizing FMLA "serious health condition" definition as
"somewhat ambiguous").
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FMLA regulations endeavored to establish a detailed definition of a
"serious health condition., 69 Despite these and other attempts to
create a concrete definition, however, the various federal courts occasionally decide factually similar cases with inconsistent and contradictory results.7 °
The FMLA also expressly protects chronic medical conditions that result in incapacity.7 For a long-term or permanent period
of incapacity, the employee or family member must be under the
continuing supervision of a health care provider. 72 Alzheimer's disease, severe strokes, or the terminal stages of a disease are examples
of this type of incapacity."
Eligible employees or their families who are receiving cosmetic treatments for acne or plastic surgery are not "serious health
conditions" unless they require inpatient hospital care or complications develop. 7 Similarly, the common cold, flu, ear aches, upset
stomach, minor ulcers, headaches other than migraine, routine dental

69 29

C.F.R. § 825.114 (1996). The FMLA began its life accompanied by
interim regulations developed by the Department of Labor, but final regulations
became effective in 1996 that attempted to clarify what conditions are "serious"
for FMLA purposes. Id.
70Compare Richmond v. Oneok, Inc., 120 F.3d 205, 209 (10th Cir. 1997)
(concluding chicken pox not "serious health condition") with George v.
Associated Stationers, 932 F. Supp. 1012, 1017 (N.D. Ohio 1996) (holding
chicken pox is "serious health condition").
" 29 C.F.R. § 825.114(a)(2)(iii) (1996). The final regulations define a
"chronic serious health condition" as one which:
A) Requires periodic visits for treatment by a health care provider, or
by a nurse or physician's assistant under direct supervision of a health
care provider;
B) Continues over an extended period of time (including recurring episodes of a single underlying condition); and
C) May cause episodic rather than a continuing period of incapacity
(e.g., asthma, diabetes, epilepsy, etc.).
Id.

, 29 C.F.R. § 825.114(a)(2)(iv) (1996).
3 id.
', 29 C.F.R. § 825.114(c) (1996).
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or orthodontia problems, or periodontal disease are examples of conditions that do not meet the definition of a "serious health condition" unless they result in inpatient care or continuing treatment by a
health care provider."5 FMLA protected leave must entail treatment
by a health care provider or by a provider of health care services on
referral by a health care provider. 6 Conversely, an employee's absence resulting from substance abuse does not qualify for FMLA
protection."
During the first five years of the Act, the number of cases in78
volving the "serious health condition" issue have risen steadily.
Federal judges look to the statute and its regulations for assistance in
determining the outcomes of these difficult cases.79

Some of the

early FMLA cases took a strict constructionist view of the "serious
health condition" requirement. 0
The case of Seidle v. Provident Mutual Life Insurance Co.8

exemplifies this narrow approach." In Seidle, the district court
granted the employer's motion for summary judgment, deciding the
plaintiff's four-year-old son's otitis media (ear infection) was not a
"serious health condition." 83 The court, referring to the Act's legislative history, noted that ear infections were "conspicuously absent"
75Id.
7629 C.F.R.
" Id.

§ 825.114(d) (1996).

See Allan N. Taffet, Family Medical Leave Act Five Years Later, Vol.
218 No. 88 N.Y.L.J. 1, (Col. 1) (1997) (commenting on foreseeability of
increasing FMLA litigation); see also William McDevitt, Commentary,
Evaluating the Current Judicial Interpretation of "Serious Health Condition"
Under the FMLA, 6 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 697, 701 (1997) (discussing causes of
increasing FMLA litigation).
,9See Martyszenko v. Safeway, Inc., 120 F.3d 120, 123-24 (8th Cir. 1997)

(evaluating whether alleged sexual molestation of plaintiff's son created serious
condition because son not "incapacitated").
'o See infra notes 84-89 (finding ear infection not "serious health
condition" despite contrary expert testimony).
s871 F. Supp. 238.
82Id. at 243-44.

8Id.
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from the list of serious health conditions. The court also considered
the fact that the plaintiff's son had only been to his doctor one time
in determining that he was not receiving "continuing treatment." 85
Interestingly, the court granted the defendant's motion for summary
judgment despite the affidavits of two medical
experts that ear in86
fections are "serious" medical conditions.
The district court in Brannon v. OshKosh B'Gosh, Inc.8 7 used
similar analytical methodology but reached a contradictory result.
In Brannon, the plaintiff's gastroenteritis and upper respiratory infection was not considered a "serious health condition" because she
failed to prove incapacitation during her absence from work.8 9 The
throat and upper respiratory infection suffered by employee's
daughter, however, did constitute a FMLA covered "serious health
condition" because of the testimony by her parents and doctor that
her fever "incapacitated" her for the statutory threshold of more
than three days. 90
Other early FMLA cases came to different judgments as to
what constituted a "serious health condition" and whether the analysis should be a question of fact or law. 9' The Department of Labor
issued an opinion letter in December of 1996 that sought to better
define the required aspects of a "serious health condition." 92 SubseId. at 242 (referencing U.S.Code Cong. & Admn. News 1993 at pp. 3,
31).

871 F. Supp. at 244.

Id. at 245.
7 897 F. Supp. 1028 (M.D. Tenn. 1995).
See id. at 1035 (discussing proper methods for determining whether
particular illness is "serious health condition").
" Id. at 1037.
90Id.

9, Compare McClain v. Southwest Steel, Co., Inc., 940 F. Supp. 295, 298
(N.D. Okl. 1996) (ruling chronic nausea, diarrhea, and severe headaches may be
"serious health condition") with Gudenkauf v. Stauffer Communications, Inc.,
922 F. Supp. 465, 475-76 (D. Kan. 1996) (finding plaintiff's pregnancy-related
back pain, nausea, headaches, and swelling not "serious health condition").
"'See FMLA-86 (discussing which illnesses should be considered "serious
health conditions" under FMLA).
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quently, federal courts considering alleged FMLA violations have
tended to view "serious health conditions" more broadly. 93
In addition, some of the latest FMLA cases evaluating this issue noted that the entire matter is often a question that a jury should
decide.9 4 In contrast, a number of courts continue to consider the
question of a "serious health condition" as a question of law. 95 The
decision often turns on the evidence that the plaintiff can provide
that tends to indicate incapacity for more than three days
combined
96
with at least one consultation with a health care provider.
Perhaps the best example of the current method of analysis is
Bauer v. Varity Dayton-Walther Corp.9 In Bauer, the plaintiff suffered from hematochezia, or the passage of bloody stools. 9 The
court found that the condition was not a "serious health condition"
because the plaintiff never sought inpatient care, was capable of perSee Price v. City of Fort Wayne, 117 F.3d at 1023 (deciding
combination of relatively minor illnesses may constitute a "serious health
condition"); see also Rhoads v. Federal Deposit Ins. Corp., 956 F. Supp. 1239,
1255 (D. Md. 1997) (concluding asthma and migraines may qualify as serious
health conditions).
'4 See Victorelli v. Shadyside Hosp., 128 F.3d at 190 (reversing district
court summary judgment for employer in case of employee with peptic ulcer).
The Victorelli court found that the final regulations of the Act allowed for
instances where the employee is suffering from incapacity only occasionally. Id.
See also Thorson v. Gemini, Inc., 123 F.3d 1140, 1141 (8th Cir. 1997) (citing
FMLA-86 in deciding minor illnesses can trigger statute if they result in
incapacity).
Murray v. Red Kap Indus., Inc., 124 F.3d at 699 (holding respiratory
tract infection not "serious health condition" as matter of law); Price v. Marathon
Cheese Corp., 119 F.3d at 335 (deciding mild carpal tunnel syndrome not
"serious health condition" as matter of law).
9 See Price v. Marathon Cheese Corp.,
119 F.3d at 335 (deciding
condition not serious where doctor did not testify condition prohibited continued
job performance); Hodgens v. General Dynamics Corp., 963 F. Supp. 102, 106
(D. R.I. 1997) (finding hypertension and arrhythmia not "serious" where plaintiff
not incapacitated).
118 F.3d 1109 (6th Cir. 1997).
9Id. at 1110.
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forming required tasks, and had perfect attendance at his new employer. 99 Although plaintiff argued that the rectal bleeding was possibly caused by cancer or another explicitly listed ailment protected
by the FMLA, the court decided that a plaintiff needs actual evidence of such a condition to qualify for FMLA leave.'00

V. CURRENT TRENDS
Initially, American business leaders questioned the efficiency
of a law that entitles employees to an additional entitlement of leave
time from their jobs, however, many employees eligible for FMLA
leave cannot afford to utilize its protections because the leave provided is unpaid.'' There is some support by Congressional Democrats, the National Partnership for Women and Families, and even
President Clinton for legislation to increase coverage of the FMLA
by including all companies with at least twenty-five employees.' 2
Understandably, pro-business members of Congress have introduced
legislation designed to make the Act more employer-friendly.' 3 The
two opposing factions seem to agree a clearer definition of what a
"serious health condition" entails will reduce the confusion over

99Id. at 1112.
''

Id.

1°'See Arielle Horman Grill, Comment, The Myth of Unpaid Family
Leave: Can the United States Implement A Paid Leave Policy Based on the
Swedish Model?, 17 COMp. LAB. L. J. 373, 374 (1996) (advocating movement
toward paid family leave).
'0'Jeri White Papa, Richard E. Kopelman, and Gillian Flynn, Sizing Up
The FMLA, 8/1/98 Personnel J. 38, 1998 WL 14114095 (highlighting differing
opinions of whether FMLA has performed as intended).
103 Id.
Representative Harris Fawell, a Republican from Illinois,
introduced the Family and Medical Leave Clarification Act in April of 1998. Id.
This legislation, an amendment to the FMLA, would, inter alia, narrow the
definition of a "serious health condition" and put a greater responsibility on the
employee to provide the employer with timely notice of their need for FMLA
leave. Id.
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whether or not an employer
is obligated to grant a FMLA leave in a
04
particular instance.1
Despite the inherent vagueness of the term "serious health
condition," the efforts of the federal judiciary have helped provide a
reasonable and supportable analytical framework to predict the outcomes of particular fact patterns. '°5 Future cases will likely turn on
whether the employee received inpatient care and was capable of
performing required tasks of their job.' ° This analysis attempts to
incorporate the FMLA stated purpose of being fair to both the employers administering their policies and the employees who occasionally require unpaid leave.'0 7
The FMLA and its corresponding final regulations take a
practical view toward an employer's obligation to provide their employees with family necessitated leave.' 8 The courts have also supported the Act's purpose of helping American workers spend time
with their families during a crisis. ' 9 The Hopson court's clear and
convincing analysis regarding the requirements an employee must
meet to give adequate notice to their employers in FMLA cases may
become the standard." 0 Therefore, courts will need to continue to
closely examine the facts of each individual case to determine
whether the employee provided the employer sufficient notice of the
need for FMLA leave, and whether the requested leave is due to a
"serious health condition" as described by the Act."'

,o See Sandra Baker, Family Leave Act Still Met With Confusion, 9/15/98
Knight-Ridder Trib. Bus. News - KRTBN (Pg. Unavail. Online) 1998 WL

16337342 (advocating for better definition of "serious health condition").
'0'See Bauer v. Varity Dayton-Walther Corp., 118 F.3d at 1112 (outlining
current FMLA analysis).
106id.
107 Id.

'08 29 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2654.
'09See Manuel v. Westlake Polymers Corp., 66 F.3d 758, 764 (5th Cir.

1995) (considering FMLA purpose when analyzing whether employee provided
adequate notice).
"0 126 F.3d 635 at 640.
11'Id.
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VI. CONCLUSION
The FMLA is still going through some understandable
growing pains associated with such a broadly structured federal statute. In addition, the sometimes conflicting judicial interpretations of
the Act have compounded these growing pains into what some have
defined as a "serious condition.""' As federal courts begin to establish more predictable methods for analyzing these cases, fewer
matters should result in litigation. Consistent results would satisfy
the FMLA's overriding goals of helping employees balance their
work and family lives, while simultaneously not overburdening
American industry.
Richard S. Stevens

...Thomas G. Servodidio, Daniel G. Anna, and Jeffrey P. Ferrier,
Employers Struggling to Resolve Convergence of ADA, FMLA 'Leave', 2/24/97
NAT'L L.J. C12, Col. 3 (complaining case law on FMLA and interaction with
ADA not yet well developed).

